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Welfare, Labor Supply and Heterogeneous Preferences: 
Evidence for Europe and the US
* 
 
Following the report of the Stiglitz Commission, measuring and comparing well-being across 
countries has gained renewed interest. Yet, analyses that go beyond income and incorporate 
non-market dimensions of welfare most often rely on the assumption of identical preferences 
to avoid the difficulties related to interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, we suggest an 
international comparison based on individual welfare rankings that fully retain preference 
heterogeneity. Focusing on the consumption-leisure trade-off, we estimate discrete choice 
labor supply models using harmonized microdata for 11 European countries and the US. We 
retrieve preference heterogeneity within and across countries and analyze several welfare 
criteria which take into account that differences in income are partly due to differences in 
tastes. The resulting welfare rankings clearly depend on the normative treatment of 
preference heterogeneity with alternative metrics. We show that these differences can indeed 
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The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
Following the report of the Stiglitz commission (Stiglitz et al, 2009), there has been a
recurrent interest in measuring and comparing well-being within and especially across
countries (e.g. Jones and Klenow, 2010). One main motivation of the report was to move
‘beyond GDP’ by recognizing the multi-dimensional character of welfare. In addition, re-
cent contributions in the theory of social choice and fair allocation shed new light on how
to reasonably measure and consistently compare individual well-being once certain non-
market domains are considered besides income and given that individuals have diﬀerent
preferences over the various dimensions of life (see e.g. Fleurbaey, 2011). In the economic
literature, one of the basic sources of well-being besides income is leisure time, resulting
in the consumption-leisure trade-oﬀ in labor supply modeling. However, while there has
been substantial progress in the development of positive labor supply models in terms
of (structurally) estimating individual consumption-leisure preferences, the heterogeneity
in preferences is usually neglected in the normative part of the analysis concerned with
welfare evaluation. This is due to the diﬃculties related to interpersonal welfare compar-
isons. A prominent approach to solve this issue is to use preferences of a certain reference
household (e.g. Aaberge et al, 2004; Aaberge and Colombino, 2011). Clearly, this makes
individual well-being comparable but the heterogeneity in preferences is assumed away. In
this paper, we contrast this approach to welfare measures that fully account for diﬀerent
individual consumption-leisure preferences (Fleurbaey, 2006, 2008) and suggest an inter-
national comparison based on pure orderings of individual well-being. Then, we illustrate
that the choice of how to treat heterogeneity in preferences may substantially aﬀect the
evaluation of welfare across diﬀerent countries.
The empirical application starts with the estimation of labor supply models, separately
for 11 European countries1 and the US. Focusing on married women, the group most
studied in the literature, we rely on 12 representative micro-datasets (on household net
income, hours worked and various socio-demographics) and a harmonized econometric
approach for all countries in order to obtain comparable estimates of consumption-leisure
preferences. We make use of a common structural discrete choice model for labor supply,
as used in well-known contributions for Europe (e.g. Van Soest, 1995) or the US (e.g.
Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). This allows us to account for the comprehensive and usually
non-linear eﬀect of tax-beneﬁt systems on household budgets, which contributes to the
identiﬁcation of the preference parameters. As the labor supply model is identiﬁed via a
direct parametrization of the utility function, we are then able to obtain indiﬀerence curves
for all individuals of all countries - and take only this ordinal information on well-being to
1These are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE),
Ireland (IE), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SW) and the United Kingdom (UK).
1derive an international ranking of individual situations for each of the alternative welfare
metrics. These rankings are simple index orderings reﬂecting interpersonal comparisons
of individual utilities and are not based on any kind of a social aggregator function.
The main results go as follows. First, we contrast the standard approaches of using
pure income or classic money metric utilities based on a reference household to that of
taking preference heterogeneity into account. Second, once heterogeneity in tastes is ac-
counted for, our ﬁndings suggest that the resulting ranking of individuals across countries
remarkably depends on the normative choice related to the metric at use. Precisely, with
a metric that evaluates agents with a higher willingness-to-work to be better oﬀ compared
to agents with a lower willingness-to-work, households from countries where average fe-
male working hours are rather high (as in the US and the Nordic countries) perform better
on average compared to a ranking based on income only. Inversely, for countries where
average working hours are rather low (as in most Continental European countries, Ireland
and the UK), the same holds true with a metric that considers agents with a relatively
lower willingness-to-work as better oﬀ. This leads to substantial reranking across nations
when moving from the former to the latter type of criteria – with remarkable changes
in average individual percentile positions of at least 15 percentage points for 7 out of
12 countries. Third, we decompose marginal rates of substitution (MRS) to extract the
role of diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity for this result. We ﬁnd that diﬀerent rankings
across welfare metrics are mainly due to heterogeneous work preferences across countries
– rather than demographic composition. Thus, the analysis clearly shows that respecting
preference heterogeneity may have substantial inﬂuences when comparing well-being in
an international context. We believe that these concerns should precede any attempts
to compare countries on the basis of social welfare functions (SWF) or other forms of
aggregated indices.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the related
literature. In Section 3 we review the welfare criteria and their normative interpretation.
Section 4 describes the empirical implementation, including the labor supply model, the
data and descriptive information. In Section 5 we present and discuss the main results
together with some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Related to the present paper, several studies have recently attempted to provide inter-
national comparisons of welfare levels relying on an equivalent income approach when
2accounting for non-material aspects of well-being.2 Becker et al (2005) correct growth
rates for life expectancy (as an indicator for quality of life). Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2009)
consider leisure, risk of unemployment, health and household composition besides GDP
in OECD countries. For a large set of 134 countries over time, Jones and Klenow (2010)
focus on consumption rather than income when accounting for several other dimensions of
well-being. Importantly, all these studies have in common that they compute equivalent
incomes at the country level assuming identical preferences across individuals (i.e., relying
on a representative agent approach). Aggregation and comparison across countries follows
by use of a SWF. However, as already pointed out by Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2009, p.
620), for \an accurate application of this methodology, one needs survey data on income
and on the additional dimensions of consumption [...], as well as on preferences [...], at
the individual level and for all the countries studied." This is precisely the path we take
in the present paper.
As standard in the labor supply literature, we retrieve individual and cross-country
speciﬁc preference heterogeneity relying on a structural discrete choice model. Naturally,
such models respect individual diﬀerences in the taste for consumption versus leisure
when estimating preference parameters. However, when it comes to welfare analyses, we
typically observe that preference heterogeneity is neglected. The main reason is the well-
known trade-oﬀ between ensuring interpersonal comparability and respecting individual
preferences (see e.g. Fleurbaey and Trannoy, 2003; Brun and Tungodden, 2004).3 In em-
pirical labor supply modeling, two main approaches emerged (besides the simple – but
still prominent – use of income as a welfare index). One is to mention, but de facto neglect
the comparability and aggregation problems in presence of preference heterogeneity and
to report averages of individual – uncomparable – equivalent or compensating variations
(see e.g. Aaberge et al, 1995, 2000; Dagsvik et al, 2009) or to aggregate them using a
certain SWF (e.g. Eissa et al, 2008; Fuest et al, 2008; Creedy and H´ erault, 2012).4 In
contrast, a second approach explicitly addresses the comparability issue using a reference
household for welfare analyses. Following King (1983), classic individual money-metric
utilities are derived by means of a ﬁxed preference function at ﬁxed reference prices (e.g.
Aaberge et al, 2004; Ericson and Flood, 2009; Aaberge and Colombino, 2011). However,
with this approach, preferences of a certain reference household build the basis for com-
2For a comprehensive overview on general attempts to construct measures of social welfare alternative
to GDP, see Fleurbaey (2009). Kassenboehmer and Schmidt (2011) critically assess the additional value
of taking into account alternative components to GDP.
3A related, more practical reason might be that even if diﬀerences in individual preferences were
accounted for, it could become a very complicated normative exercise to determine the weights assigned
to individual utilities in order to aggregate them.
4Indeed, reference prices (wages) for calculations of equivalent and compensating variations are nat-
urally individual and thus, variable. Aggregated indices based on equivalent or compensating variations
are therefore inconsistent as long as they are not based on a representative agent approach.
3paring individual well-being, which are hence no longer individual speciﬁc but uniﬁed and
determined by the social planner.5
In the present paper we adopt an approach from the recent social choice literature that
allows to fully respect individual preferences in welfare analyses (Fleurbaey, 2006, 2008,
2011; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2006). In this approach, interpersonal comparisons can be
conceived directly in terms of subsets of the consumption-leisure space which are nested
into each other. The chosen bundle on a given indiﬀerence curve can thus be evaluated
based on the subset that is tangent to the individual indiﬀerence curve. This allows
deriving a welfare metric which will be clearly ordered for diﬀerent preferences, making
individual situations unambiguously comparable. In the consumption-leisure context, the
derivation of comparable, nested subsets requires to either ﬁx a speciﬁc net wage rate
or a certain amount of non-labor income. While this procedure is thus similar to the
derivation of classic equivalent incomes, the choice of the reference values is grounded
on speciﬁc fairness considerations. This makes the normative priors of the interpersonal
comparison more explicit – as, e.g., requested by Atkinson (2011).6 So far, measures of
this kind have not been implemented empirically except in Decoster and Haan (2010)
and the present paper. While those authors address preference heterogeneity within a
country (Germany), we compute equivalent incomes for individuals of 12 countries and
analyze how international rankings vary with the use of alternative welfare metrics. In
particular, we focus on the extent to which welfare evaluation is aﬀected by that part
of heterogeneous work preferences which is genuinely country-speciﬁc.7 In addition, we
assess the role of diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity for the resulting diﬀerences in welfare
rankings.
5Then, welfare changes are usually evaluated using a certain SWF over individual money-metric
utilities. This generated another stream of criticism, initiated by Blackorby and Donaldson (1988): a
SWF over equivalent incomes usually fails to be quasi-concave in commodity consumptions which is
incompatible with a minimal preference for equality.
6Choosing reference values based on certain fairness considerations is the actual novelty of the fair
allocation approach compared to classical demand theory when deriving equivalent incomes. See Preston
and Walker (1999), for instance, who derive a similar set of metrics in line with the latter. More popular,
however, has been the alternative of exploring reference price independent comparisons of individual
welfare (see e.g. Roberts, 1980; Slesnick, 1991; Blackorby et al, 1993).
7This can also be motivated by a prominent debate about what determines diﬀerences in labor supply
behavior across countries, particularly between Europe and the US. Prescott (2004) states that diﬀerent
labor supply elasticities are almost only due to diﬀerences in tax-transfer systems. This view has been
criticized by Blanchard (2004) who – in line with Alesina et al (2005) – argues that diﬀerent preferences
for leisure indeed play a role and are maybe due to cultural diﬀerences. Our ﬁndings, which control for
country-speciﬁc consumption-leisure preferences, tend to support the latter view.
43 Theoretical framework
In order to respect preference heterogeneity in the consumption-leisure space, we follow
Fleurbaey (2006, 2008) and look at individual welfare measures which speciﬁcally diﬀer in
the way they treat heterogeneity in tastes. In the following, we introduce these measures
and their underlying normative rationales. We refer to Fleurbaey (2006, 2008) for the
axiomatic derivation and to Decoster and Haan (2010) for a more detailed illustration.
However, while those studies deﬁne the metrics in the usual social choice terminology
(i.e. as means of budget sets), we “translate” them into the language of classical demand
theory in order to bring them closer to the usual notation used for welfare analyses in
(empirical) labor supply models.
The setup. Assume that agent i has individual preferences over consumption ci and
labor time hi, denoted Ri, and ci 2 R+, hi 2 [0,1]. By Ri, agent i weakly prefers













i). Observed preference heterogeneity is
introduced via an individual speciﬁc vector zi (containing all characteristics determin-
ing individual preferences), Ri = R(zi), and thus ui(ci,hi) = u(ci,hi;zi). The chosen
bundle (ci,hi) results from a classic individual utility maximization problem. Let f(.)
represent the tax-transfer function that transforms gross non-labor income Ii and gross
labor income wih (with wi denoting individual i’s gross wage) into net income c, i.e.
(ci,hi) = max[u(c,h;zi)jc  f(Ii,wih),h  1]. Hence, the observed bundle of consump-
tion and leisure results from individual choices subject to preferences and a budget con-
straint.
The welfare metrics. Assume the individual’s utility function u(ci,hi;zi) = ui(ci,hi)
to be well-behaved, i.e. continuous and increasing in their arguments as well as quasicon-
cave in (c,h). Furthermore, assume tax-transfer rules f(.) determining individual budget
sets c  f(Ii,wih) to be non-linear – as generally observed in reality. Then, for each chosen
bundle (ci,hi) on a given individual indiﬀerence curve ICi = ci(u,hi) = min[cijui(ci,hi) 
u], an associated hypothetical, linear budget constraint that would leave the individual
indiﬀerent between choosing from this or her actual budget, can be derived as c  ˜ wih+µi
with virtual non-labor income µi determined by virtual net wage ˜ wi - as illustrated for
bundles a and b in the upper-left panel of Figure 1. For the deﬁnition of diﬀerent metrics
below we further deﬁne the expenditure function ei(u, ˜ wi) = min[ci   ˜ wihijui(ci,hi)  u],
with a ﬁxed level of utility u. The slope of the indiﬀerence curve in a given bundle (c,h)
is deﬁned as the MRS between consumption and hours worked, MRSc;h =  
@u=@h
@u=@c. An








































The “rent + reference wage” metric












Figure 1: The diﬀerent welfare metrics graphically
i′, if in a given bundle (c,h), its indiﬀerence curve ICi is steeper (ﬂatter) than the indif-
ference curve of individual i′, ICi′, and thus, MRSc;h;i > (<) MRSc;h;i′ (given that the
indiﬀerence curves cross at most once). In this setting, diﬀerent metrics can be formulated
by means of hypothetical budget constraints with speciﬁc choices of the virtual net wage
rate or virtual non-labor income.8
First, the “wage” metric is deﬁned as the slope of the tangent through the origin
at a given indiﬀerence curve ICi, equaling the wage rate ˜ wi of individual i when the
value of the virtual non-labor income is set to a reference value of 0, i.e. µi = µr = 0.
The corresponding function might be called a wage equivalent as ﬁrstly introduced by
Pencavel (1977). The upper-right picture of Figure 1 shows that by use of the metric
νW
i (u,µr), the two agents can be unambiguously ordered from better to worse oﬀ even
8Note, that the hypothetical budget constraint c  ˜ wih + i only applies to the logic of the metrics,
hence, to hypothetical choices of the individuals which might be only by accident consistent with observed
choices. The latter are assumed to be always determined by the budget constraint c  f(Ii;wih) which





r = 0) = min
˜ wi
[˜ wijvi(˜ wi,µ
r = 0)  u] (1)
Second, the “rent + reference wage” criterion compares individual situations de-
pending on a certain reference value for the virtual net wage rate, ˜ wi = wr. Then, the
resulting welfare metric νRW
i (u,wr) is the value of the corresponding virtual non-labor








rhijui(ci,hi)  u] (2)
Third, the “rent” metric directly emerges by setting ˜ wi = wr = 0. As far as we
assume well-behaved utility functions, this is equivalent to hours worked being set to a
reference value of hi = hr = 0. The resulting metric νR
i (u,hr) hence is the value of the
intersection of the indiﬀerence curve with the ordinate, equaling the corresponding virtual




r = 0) = ci(u,0) = min
ci
[cijui(ci,0)  u] (3)
Normative interpretation. The key feature of the metrics deﬁned is that they fully
respect preferences: all metrics will increase when the individual moves to a bundle on a
higher indiﬀerence curve of her own preference ordering. However, allowing for preference
heterogeneity creates serious problems for interpersonal comparisons of well-being. It
especially raises a question of fairness, i.e., who is to be considered better and worse oﬀ
and thus, who should eventually redistribute towards whom - when accounting for the
fact that individual outcomes result not only from endowed circumstances, but also from
individual preferences. The literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism addresses
this problem by keeping individuals responsible for the latter, but not for the former
(Fleurbaey, 2008).
In order to operationalize this principle for social evaluation, two competing inter-
pretations evolved in the economic literature, namely the compensation and the (liberal)
reward principle. The former says that inequalities due to endowed circumstances (i.e.
not due to responsibility factors) should be equalized. In contrast, the latter states that
no further redistribution should be performed beyond what is required by the compensa-
tion principle, remaining neutral towards inequalities due to individual preferences. Even
if similar at a ﬁrst glance, both principles are logically independent and to some extent
are even in conﬂict with each other. Note that the three measures deﬁned give priority
to the compensation principle: individuals with poorer hypothetical circumstances are
always ranked worse oﬀ and should be compensated (as can be seen from Figure 1). As
7long as preferences are equal, the metrics will rank individuals in exactly the same way.
However, once preferences diﬀer (as shown in Figure 1 with crossing indiﬀerence curves),
on certain occasions, compensation will also depend on the willingness-to-work each agent
reveals. This might lead to favoring the industrious (or work averse) of two individuals in
the given context even if the actual inﬂuence of circumstances on outcomes was equal - a
clear conﬂict with the reward principle. Loosely speaking, the reason is that the inﬂuence
of circumstances on outcomes can not be separated from the inﬂuence of preferences on
the same outcomes, leading to a clash between the compensation and the reward principle.
In this paper, we are especially interested in the diﬀerences between individual welfare
metrics that result from this clash. That is, we study if and how respecting preference
heterogeneity systematically alters interpersonal comparisons of well-being - in an inter-
national empirical context. Thereby, we focus on simple index orderings of individual
well-being levels and do not consider any speciﬁc social ordering function. The latter
would go beyond the question of “who is better and worse oﬀ” and additionally requires
weighting individual utilities. We restrict ourselves to the former and will thus not perform
any optimization exercise nor do we treat actual redistributive issues between individuals
and/or countries (for this distinction see also Fleurbaey, 2007).
In sum, what is relevant for interpersonal welfare comparisons is the fact that all
the measures deﬁned rank individuals with the same preferences in the same way (i.e.
in accordance with how these individuals would themselves rank their bundles) - while
their sole diﬀerence is in the way they treat heterogeneity in tastes. Then, once we accept
that those metrics might remain non-neutral with respect to individual preferences, the
ethical choice at hand is not related to the compensation versus the reward principle but
to the choice of the references for interpersonal comparisons that generate the diﬀerences
between the metrics. This is explained in the following.
In a consumption-leisure space, individuals have diﬀerent preferences for work (result-
ing in diﬀerent levels of exhibited eﬀort) while skill levels (as reﬂected in gross wages)
and non-labor income are assumed to be exogenous endowments to the individuals. The
welfare measures deﬁned evaluate individual situations according to hypothetical refer-
ence amounts of those endowments such that they would allow individuals to reach their
current utility level.
First, the “rent” metric asks for the amount of (hypothetical) net income which would
be enough to remain equally well oﬀ compared to the initial situation if one did no longer
have to earn it. The resulting metric is simply the level of consumption when working
zero hours which corresponds to the level of virtual non-labor income at a reference wage
of zero. The bottom-right picture of Figure 1 illustrates, that in this case, we judge the
agent who gets bundle b, say Bob, with a relatively lower willingness-to-work to be worse
oﬀ compared to the agent who has bundle a, and a higher willingness-to-work, say Ann.
8Thereby, redistribution would be granted from Ann to Bob and we might hold Bob only
minimally responsible for his preferences.
Second, the “rent + reference wage” metric asks which amount of (virtual) non-labor
income would make the individual equally well oﬀ compared to her actual situation when
receiving a positive (hypothetical) reference wage equal to wr. Clearly, the higher this
reference wage is, the worse oﬀ relatively industrious individuals will be evaluated, i.e. the
more they will be favored and receiving protection. This is illustrated in the bottom-left
picture of Figure 1 where wr is constructed such that the associated linear budget curve
is tangent to ICb in the intersection point with the ordinate. In this case, we evaluate
Bob to be better oﬀ than Ann for any w  wr.
Third, the “wage” metric asks which wage rate would leave the individual indiﬀerent
from her current utility level if she had zero (virtual) non-labor income? 9 Note, that this
metric diﬀers from the previous ones in the sense that its properties are less clear in terms
of favoring the industrious or work averse. In the upper-right picture of Figure 1, work
averse Bob is considered to be better oﬀ compared to industrious Ann and redistribution
(in order to equalize hypothetical wage rates) would be justiﬁed from Bob to Ann. How-
ever, one might easily construct a situation where two agents with crossing preferences
are evaluated in the opposite direction by means of the “wage” metric.10
4 Empirical approach
The theoretical section presented three speciﬁc individual welfare measures that take into
account that individuals might have diﬀerent preferences for consumption versus leisure.
In this section, we illustrate the empirical application of the metrics. We proceed as
follows. First, we collect information about individuals’ consumption and leisure in 12
countries. Second, we estimate individual preferences based on those revealed choices
and various socio-demographic characteristics. Third, we calculate the welfare metrics
based on individual consumption-leisure bundles and the estimated preferences (individual
indiﬀerence curves).
Thereby, using data from diﬀerent countries enables us to take into account cross-
9The underlying fairness criterion is developed in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006): in an hypothetical
world with equal wage rates and zero non-labor income, diﬀerences in consumption-leisure bundles would
not call for redistribution as they can only be due to diﬀerences in preferences and laisser-faire would be the
best policy. The “wage” metric might thus be interpreted as holding individuals maximally responsible
for their willingness-to-work. Hodler (2009) uses this metric to study the eﬀect of redistribution on
inequality in a highly stylized setting when a population is heterogeneous in abilities and work-leisure
preferences. A variant of the metric is applied in Ooghe and Peichl (2011) to derive optimal taxes when
agents only have partial control over certain eﬀort variables.
10Thus, further research will be necessary to systematically determine how especially the wage metric
treats agents with diﬀerent preferences. In fact, in the empirical section of this paper it turns out that
(on average) we are making more comparisons of the kind illustrated in Figure 1.
9country diﬀerences in consumption-leisure preferences, i.e. preference proﬁles of diﬀerent
populations besides the heterogeneity in individual tastes within a country. Addressing
these potential diﬀerences requires to keep other factors of the analysis (socio-demographic
variation, diﬀerences in the tax-benﬁt systems etc.) as comparable as possible. We there-
fore make use of a unique setting and estimate household preferences in a harmonized way
for all countries under analysis by using (a) comparable datasets with common variable
deﬁnitions, (b) a common econometric approach to estimate labor supply models for each
country and (c) a harmonized tax-beneﬁt calculator to compute net incomes at diﬀerent
points of the household budget curves as required by the nature of the labor supply model
and explained below. We also focus on a speciﬁc subgroup of the population, namely mar-
ried women. First, married women is the group most studied in the labor supply literature
as they show lots of variation in work duration and thus also relatively considerable dif-
ferences in labor supply elasticities (see e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Since this
variation partly is aﬀected by diﬀerences in consumption-leisure preferences, it might also
help to identify diﬀerences in the empirical welfare measures. Second, married women’s
labor supply is less likely to be contaminated by demand-side restrictions compared to
single individuals or married men (Bargain et al, 2010), a factor not explicitly considered
with our approach (see below).
The empirical model is directly compatible with the theoretical framework presented
in the previous section. The only diﬀerence is that we consider “unitary” households
rather than individuals, i.e., couples are assumed to behave as a single decision maker
regarding the trade-oﬀ between consumption and female labor supply (male labor supply
is kept ﬁxed).
Speciﬁcation of preferences. In order to empirically derive the welfare metrics, we
must retrieve indiﬀerence curves for each household in our sample and, hence, estimate
utility functions. To do so, we specify a structural model of labor supply with discrete
choices, which is standard in the literature on tax reforms (see e.g. Aaberge et al, 1995;
Van Soest, 1995; Blundell et al, 2000).11 Agents are assumed to choose among a set
of discrete hours alternatives rather than continuously distributed options which better
corresponds to the observed distribution of available hours (non-participation and several
part-time, full-time and over-time categories). Also, a discrete choice model better allows
to account for the non-linear eﬀect of tax-beneﬁt systems on household budgets as net
income needs to be determined at each discrete point. Consumption-leisure preferences
are explicitly parameterized as follows while a common speciﬁcation over all countries is
applied for reasons of comparability. We denote cij the net income (or consumption, in
11Relying on structural models is also the only way to obtain comparable preference estimates across
countries. It seems indeed diﬃcult to ﬁnd natural experiments that would allow performing this task.
10a static framework) of household i and hij the wife’s working hours at choice j = 1,...,J
where the household is assumed to obtain a utility level:
Vij = ui(cij,(T   hij)) + ϵij, (4)
with (T  hi) the wife’s “leisure time” (which may include time for domestic production),
i.e., total time-endowment T minus formal hours of work. For the deterministic part of
the utility function, we rely on a Box-Cox speciﬁcation, that is:






(T   hij)l   1
αl
. (5)
This speciﬁcation is frequently used for welfare assessments (see e.g. Aaberge et al, 1995,
2000, 2004; Decoster and Haan, 2010; Aaberge and Colombino, 2011; Blundell and Shep-
hard, forthcoming). Importantly for our purpose, it is easy to check that monotonicity
and concavity conditions on consumption and leisure are satisﬁed (respectively βc > 0
and βli > 0 for monotonicity and αc < 1 and αl < 1 for concavity). Indeed, tangency
conditions are necessary for measuring and interpreting the welfare metrics in a straight-
forward way. The deterministic utility is completed by i.i.d. random terms ϵij for each
choice, leading to the individual random utility function Vij(ui,ϵij). By using a random
utility concept, we especially account for the fact that there will always be characteristics
of the household (inﬂuencing the hours choice) that are known by the household itself
while being unobserved by the econometrician. This speciﬁcally includes that for a given
household, tastes may vary across opportunities which will not be captured by estimat-
ing the deterministic part of the utility function (McFadden, 1974).12 As a consequence,
non-concavity of ui would not be inconsistent with random utility theory (as long as Vi is
quasi-concave). However, this restrictive assumption is necessary in order to empirically
derive (well-behaved) welfare metrics in line with the theory laid out in Section 3. This is
explained below where we suggest a way to empirically deal with this issue. In addition,
in Section 5.4, we check robustness with respect to a diﬀerent, more ﬂexible speciﬁcation
of the utility function and to alternative ways to empirically compute the welfare metrics.
Under the (standard) assumption that random terms follow an extreme value type I
(EV-I) distribution, the probability for each household of choosing a given alternative has
an explicit logistic form, which is a function of deterministic utilities at all choices. Then,
the likelihood of a sample of observed choices can be derived from these probabilities
as a function of the preference parameters whose estimates are obtained by maximum
likelihood techniques (see McFadden, 1974).
12Besides, the random term might also capture possible observational errors, optimization errors or
transitory situations.
11A crucial point for our analysis is the source of heterogeneity across households. The
ﬁrst obvious diﬀerence is that α and β parameters are country-speciﬁc, i.e., they are esti-
mated separately for each country. The second source is household-speciﬁc heterogeneity
through the leisure term, which is speciﬁed as follows:
βli = βl0 + βlzzi, (6)
with zi a vector of taste shifters including the age of both spouses, education of the
women, presence of children younger than 3, between 3-6 or 7-12 years old and regional
information.
Note that we keep the labor supply model as simple as possible in order to ensure
a straightforward implementation and clear interpretation of the welfare metrics. This
particularly implies that we do not model potential demand side restrictions on the labor
market nor ﬁxed costs of work. This is further discussed in Section 6.
Data, selection and tax-beneﬁt simulation. For our empirical application, we focus
on a selection of 11 European countries and the US. For each country we use microdata
based on standard household surveys which provide information on incomes and demo-
graphics. For EU countries, we rely on datasets combined with the simulation of national
tax-beneﬁt systems for years 1998 or 2001 as described in Bargain et al (2012). For the US,
we use 2006 IPUMS-CPS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series; Current Population
Survey) data containing information for the year 2005. As mentioned above, we focus on
the subpopulation of married couples and estimate the labor supply of the women. Clearly,
this assumes away potential cross eﬀects between labor supply decisions of the spouses.
However, given the illustrative purpose of the paper, this assumption seems acceptable.
To keep the sample relatively homogeneous and avoid too much variation in household’s
non-labor income (in this context especially including husbands’ labor income), we select
households where husbands at least work 30 hours/week and exclude those with extreme
amounts of capital income. Furthermore, we keep households where women are aged
between 18 and 59 and available for the labor market, i.e., neither disabled nor retired
nor in education. In order to maintain a comparable framework while respecting possible
variation in the hours distribution across countries, we adopt a discretization with J = 7
hours categories including non-participation, two part-time options, two full-time and two
over-time categories (0 to 60 hours/week with a step of 10 hours). Net income at each dis-
crete choice j = 1,...,J is calculated as a function cij = f(wihij,Ii,xi) of female earnings
wihij and household non-labor income Ii (i.e., household capital income and husbands’
earnings. Female wages wi are predicted for all observations using calculated wage rates
of the workers and estimated with the usual correction for selection bias. The function
12f(.) represents how gross income is transformed into net income, i.e., the impact of taxes
and beneﬁts which also depends on certain household demographic characteristics xi.13
It is calculated numerically using microsimulation models EUROMOD for EU countries
and the NBER’s TAXSIM for the US.14
Empirical welfare metrics. We empirically compute welfare measures based on in-
dividual preferences for each household in the sample. Importantly, the random utility
framework leads to a frequency distribution of hours choices across the discrete alter-
natives rather than a perfect prediction of the observed choice. Therefore, we have to
compute expected values for the metrics. Yet, one might argue that using a concept of
expected measures contradicts the normative background of the individual welfare mea-
sures, which essentially relies on observed preferences (derived from observed choices).
Thus, in order to bring the probabilistic nature of the empirical labor supply model and
individual choices together, several approaches are possible. In the baseline, we compute
expected metrics as described below and provide robustness checks on diﬀerent methods
in Section 5.4.
First, we generate a set of r = 1,...,R draws from the EV-I distributed random variable
ϵj for the given ﬁxed set of hours alternatives (including non-participation). For each draw
r, we then compute each individual’s utilities V for each alternative j (suppressing index i
in the following). As explained above, the welfare metrics can only be empirically derived
in a consistent way for well-behaved indiﬀerence curves, i.e. based on the deterministic
utility. Thus, the deterministic part of the utility of the chosen alternative (the one with
highest V ), umax
r , will form the basis of the welfare metric for each draw. Subsequently, we





r . This “expected optimal utility” ¯ u is
used to empirically derive individual indiﬀerence curves IC¯ u, using the general function as
introduced in Section 3 applied to the Box-Cox speciﬁcation given in equation (5). Finally,
equivalent incomes are computed as follows.15 For the “rent” metric, an analytical solution
13Using predicted wages for all observations helps to reduce some of the bias due to measurement
errors on wages if calculated on basis of yearly income information (division bias). Also, accounting fully
for existing tax-beneﬁt rules completes the identiﬁcation. Indeed, individuals face diﬀerent eﬀective tax-
beneﬁt schedules because of their diﬀerent circumstances and socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. age,
family compositions, region or levels of non-labor income). This creates variation in net wages between
people with the same gross wage. Using nonlinearities and discontinuities generated by the tax-beneﬁt
system in this way is a frequent identiﬁcation strategy in the empirical literature based on static discrete
models and cross-sectional data (e.g. Van Soest, 1995; Blundell et al, 2000). See Bargain et al (2012) for
a more thorough discussion on this point.
14For an introduction to EUROMOD, descriptive information of taxes and transfers in the EU and
robustness checks for tax-beneﬁt calculation, see Sutherland (2007). An introduction to TAXSIM is
provided by Feenberg and Coutts (1993). Both calculators have been already used in several empirical
studies (see e.g. Immervoll et al, 2007 for EUROMOD or Eissa et al, 2008 for TAXSIM).
15We abstain from providing the relevant formulas for the concrete Box-Cox speciﬁcation in order not
to exacerbate the understanding of the main procedures with unnecessary technical issues (see Decoster
13is obtained by setting h to zero into the formula for IC¯ u and retrieving the corresponding
level of consumption (hence, the intersection level of IC¯ u with the ordinate), see bottom-
right panel of Figure 1. Due to the Box-Cox speciﬁcation of the deterministic utility we are
not able to derive analytical expressions for the other two metrics. Hence, we must apply
numerical procedures. This basically requires searching for the relevant tangency point
(c,h) of IC¯ u with the hypothetical budget line corresponding to the metric of interest -
along the full shape of each individual indiﬀerence curve on the hours interval [0,T] (while
this point, again, usually will be diﬀerent from the observed bundle). Once the tangency
point (c,h) is found, the value for the metric is determined as well. More precisely, for the
“rent + reference wage” metric, the tangency point is the point (c,h) on IC¯ u for which
the MRSc;h equals the reference wage wr. The virtual non-labor income µ corresponding
to this tangency point is the value for the metric (see bottom-left panel of Figure 1).
Finally, the “wage” metric is derived as the slope of IC¯ u for which the MRSc;h, because
of the zero virtual non-labor income, equals c
h (see top-right panel of Figure 1). For the
numerical derivation of the two last metrics, we rely on a precise iterative procedure by
incrementing hours from 0 to T for each household in the sample using very small steps
(0.01 hours/week). Note that this is diﬀerent from moving across discrete categories
j = 1,...,J as used for the labor supply estimation.
Descriptive information. In Table 1, we present summary statistics for the sample
under analysis. The ﬁrst two columns show the average weekly household net and non-
labor income by countries (recall that household non-labor income essentially includes
husband’s earnings). Next, female average wage rates, weekly working hours as well
as participation rates are presented. Depending on the year of the data, incomes and
wages are up- or downrated to the reference year 2001 and transferred into comparable
Purchasing Power Parities (PPP)-USD.
Women from the US show the highest net wages per hour and clearly work more (27.2)
than average weekly hours across countries (24.7). Together with husbands’ earnings, this
results in the highest household net income on average per week in the sample (1158 PPP-
USD). However, females from the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) show the
highest inclination to work (all above 30 hours/week and participation rates larger than
80%). Also, Portuguese married women, the well-known exception out of the Southern
European countries, tend to work more than US females - even though their wages are by
far the lowest across countries. In contrast, women from Germany, Ireland, Austria and
the Netherlands show relatively low participation rates and hours.
and Haan, 2010, for details). The reader may verify the proceeding directly via Figure 1 and the formulas
introduced in Section 3.
14Table 1: Income and employment statistics
Data Net Non-labor Female Female Female
year income income wages hours participation
per week per week per hour per week rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AT 1998 777 618 11.5 17.9 0.60
BE 2001 823 618 13.9 25.1 0.77
DK 1998 793 562 12.3 30.2 0.84
FI 1998 627 427 9.6 32.3 0.85
FR 2001 688 508 10.9 23.8 0.72
GE 1998 696 545 13.3 19.7 0.64
IE 2001 883 683 10.5 19.3 0.63
NL 2001 804 635 12.4 18.2 0.71
PT 2001 517 370 6.7 28.2 0.76
SW 2001 708 489 11.2 31.3 0.92
UK 1998 798 593 9.5 23.1 0.75
US 2005 1158 857 18.4 27.2 0.71
Note: The whole sample consists of 42975 households with the husband at least working 30
hours/week. By speciﬁcation, household’s non-labor income includes husband’s earnings.
Income and hours are averages/week, wages are averages/hour. Income and wages in 2001
PPP-USD. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
5 Results
This section presents results of the empirical analysis in four steps. First, we outline
estimated household and country speciﬁc preference heterogeneity. Then, we present in-
formation on cross-country orderings for the diﬀerent individual welfare measures. Next,
a decomposition of total heterogeneity into estimated preferences and demographic com-
position is performed. Finally, we present some robustness checks.
5.1 Estimated preference heterogeneity
We ﬁrst present estimation results for the utility function, separately retrieved for each
country with the same empirical speciﬁcation. For lack of space and to summarize prefer-
ence heterogeneity across countries, we focus on average MRS between consumption and
hours worked deﬁned as the amount of net income in PPP-USD that is needed by an
household to be compensated for an one hour increase in weekly labor time. Note that
MRS are of key relevance in our analysis, rather than labor supply elasticities; while the
latter are determined by individual budget constraints and preferences, the former solely
represent consumption-leisure tastes in the given framework.16 For all observations i,
16This should be distinguished from the fact that individual preferences and thus, MRS, might be also
(indirectly) formed by the (country-speciﬁc) design of tax-beneﬁt systems in the long run. However, this
interesting topic can not be considered in the given static framework, where preferences and constraints
15MRSi are computed as the slope of individual indiﬀerence curves at a ﬁxed consumption-
labor bundle. By doing so, we exclusively capture the shape of diﬀerent preferences rather
than the impact of diﬀerent actual locations (c,h) along individual indiﬀerence curves for
a set of given estimates.17 In Table 2, ﬁxed (c,h)-bundles correspond to the average and
to certain percentiles of the global hours distributions (p10-, p50 - and p90-values) with
accordant net incomes. MRS substantially diﬀer across countries. They are particularly
large in Ireland, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, countries known for low partici-
pation levels among married women (see Table 1). Inversely, Nordic countries, Portugal,
Belgium and the US show the relatively lowest MRS on average. Given our focus on the
role of heterogeneity in welfare evaluations, we shall decompose the variations of MRS
with respect to country demographics and country preferences in Section 5.3.18
Table 2: Marginal rates of substitution (between consumption and labor) by countries
MRS Standard MRS MRS MRS (
c(¯ h),¯ h
)
error (c(hp10),hp10) (c(hp50),hp50) (c(hp90),hp90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample 8.7 (5.3) 7.0 9.6 12.0
AT 13.2 (5.3) 10.9 13.8 17.1
BE 7.1 (2.1) 5.8 7.7 9.5
DK 5.5 (0.6) 4.4 6.2 7.7
FI 3.8 (0.5) 2.9 4.3 5.5
FR 9.5 (3.1) 7.3 10.9 13.9
DE 13.2 (8.1) 10.7 14.7 17.9
IE 17.6 (7.4) 13.9 19.1 24.2
NL 13.2 (5.1) 10.3 14.8 18.8
PT 3.7 (1.0) 3.0 4.0 5.0
SW 5.3 (0.7) 3.9 6.4 8.4
UK 9.6 (4.5) 7.7 10.5 13.1





is the bundle with global mean hours ¯ h and corresponding net income c(¯ h). (
c(hp10);hp10)
contains the mean hours of the 10th percentile in the global hours distribution
and the corresponding mean net income c(hp10). For p50- and p90-values accordingly. c-values
in 2001 PPP-USD. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
are clearly separated by construction of the labor supply model. What remains, of course, is the direct
inﬂuence of tax-beneﬁt systems in the estimation procedure which, however, is genuine as preferences are
deﬁned over leisure and net (rather than gross) income.
17As a preliminary check, we have veriﬁed that MRS are always positive and increasing as required
from Section 3 – i.e., for all countries, we ﬁnd that c > 0, c < 1 and l < 1; for the term li which
incorporates heterogeneity, no more than 1% of the observations per country violates the monotonicity
condition on leisure – these observations are excluded from the sample.
18Precise estimation tables are available from the authors upon request. The impact of taste shifters
(age, children etc.) is reported in Table 6 in the Appendix. We ﬁnd that the compensation needed in
income to outweigh one additional hour of work is clearly higher for women with young children or lowly
educated females compared to the average. That is, MRS are declining in age of children and level of
education. For instance, the average MRS for women with children younger than 3 years old is about 5
PPP-USD higher compared to the average MRS of the whole sample (13:7 versus 8:7 PPP-USD).
165.2 Cross-country welfare rankings
We ﬁrst pool households from all countries into one sample and compare individual ranks
for the diﬀerent metrics by use of correlation plots. Moving closer to country comparisons,
we then investigate how average country positions change by choice of the metric.
Rank correlations. For the pooled country sample, Figure 2 shows empirical rank
correlations between individual positions in the percentile distribution of the diﬀerent
metrics. For the sake of comparison, the two upper panels show correlations when identical
preferences are assumed (instead of allowing for full heterogeneity). This corresponds to
the prominent approach in empirical welfare analysis described above. Precisely, for all
households in the pooled sample, we ﬁx their preferences to that of the global median
household (in terms of MRSc(¯ h);¯ h) while retaining their actual (c,h)-choices and non-
preference related characteristics (net wages and non-labor income). The metrics are
recalculated under these conditions. As indicated in the upper-left panel of Figure 2, any
metric can be used at this stage without altering the correlation (which is independent
of the choice of the reference household and veriﬁed in the upper-right panel).19 Note
that overall reranking due to the account of leisure in the money metrics is fairly modest
when agents do not diﬀer in preferences. This could of course vary with the choice of the
reference household and is checked in the robustness analysis in Section 5.4.
The next four panels of Figure 2 compare rank distributions for two measures at a time
when full heterogeneity in preferences is accounted for. We observe substantial reranking
of individual positions between the metrics. While the center-left panel of Figure 2 still
reveals a quite strong correlation between the individual positions under pure income and
the “rent” metric (similar to the upper-left picture), the correlation between the “rent”
and the further metrics in the following three panels sequentially decreases when taking
preferences for leisure increasingly into account. In the bottom-right panel, only a weak
correlation remains between the “rent” and the “wage” metric, showing the relatively
largest reranking between individual situations. The next paragraph analyzes to which
extent these rerankings aﬀect cross-country orderings of individual welfare.
Welfare rankings. As a preliminary exercise, we compare cumulative distribution func-
tions (CDF) of the diﬀerent metrics for two illustrative countries, namely the US and Ire-
land. The upper-left panel of Figure 3 shows that US households are relatively better oﬀ
in terms of income or under the “rent” criterion. However, moving to the “rent+reference
wage” metric, CDFs start to cross and households from the US become worse oﬀ. For the
19Indeed, this illustrates nothing else than what Roberts (1980) proved, namely, that individual welfare
orderings are reference price independent when preferences are homogeneous across individuals.
17Figure 2: Rank correlations of empirical welfare metrics using reference preferences vs.


























































































































Note: Income, metrics and reference wage RW (p50−wage of the global distribution) in 2001 PPP−USD.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) by metrics for 2 selected countries
“wage” criterion, Irish households are now clearly better oﬀ. In the following, we ana-
lyze for the pooled country sample how these diﬀerences in CDFs translate into diﬀerent
cross-country welfare rankings.
In Table 3, we use the global distribution of individual ranks to compare countries
on basis of the average percentile position of households for each measure. Our focus is
on how the country ranking changes with the deﬁnition of the metric, i.e. with diﬀer-
ent normative rationales about how to treat heterogeneity in preferences. When using
the pure income measure in column 1, consumption-leisure preferences are simply ne-
glected. Here, US households clearly rank ﬁrst on average (63rd percentile), due to high
average working hours and wage rates.20 In the second column, individual heterogene-
ity in consumption-leisure preferences is neglected and identical preferences are assumed
(reference household). Recall that, corresponding to the previous paragraph, individ-
ual positions (and thus, also average percentile positions by countries) do not change
by deﬁnition of the metric under these conditions. For instance, we see that Irish (US)
households rank slightly better (worse) on average under the metrics than under pure
income – simply, because a money metric accounts for leisure on top of income while Irish
(US) women work relatively less (more) than the average.21
Once heterogeneous work preferences are fully respected, the rankings will change
20Country rankings for net income are also broadly in line with respective GDP rankings. Accordant
ﬁgures are available upon request.
21However, recall from the previous paragraph that this result is dependent on the speciﬁcation of
the reference household. “Extreme” reference preferences in terms of very large (small) MRS will aﬀect
absolute percentile values. See Section 5.4.
19Table 3: Average percentile position of households in the global welfare ranking - by
country and metrics
Ref. preferences Full heterogeneity in preferences ∆pp
Income Any metric Rent RW p25 RW p50 RW p75 Wage Rent-Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AT 43.6 47.4 41.3 49.1 54.4 58.1 61.0 19.7
BE 49.2 48.6 49.9 47.9 45.4 43.3 42.1 - 7.9
DK 47.2 42.5 48.0 39.9 35.2 32.2 31.3 - 16.7
FI 29.7 23.9 34.3 18.6 15.5 13.7 13.9 - 20.4
FR 34.4 34.5 34.1 35.5 36.1 37.1 37.3 3.2
GE 36.3 38.9 35.9 40.4 43.8 46.7 50.4 14.5
IE 53.1 56.2 46.5 53.8 60.6 66.5 73.9 27.4
NL 47.6 51.3 47.4 53.0 57.1 60.4 64.6 17.2
PT 19.1 17.8 21.8 15.4 13.9 12.8 12.3 - 9.5
SW 38.1 33.4 41.9 29.1 25.8 24.0 23.8 - 18.2
UK 45.0 45.7 44.2 46.2 47.1 47.7 48.4 4.2
US 63.3 62.2 63.4 61.7 60.1 58.5 56.7 - 6.7
Note: For each metric, we compute the percentile position of each household in the global
ranking and average them across all households from the respective country. Reference wages
for the “rent + reference wage” metrics (RW) are p25-, p50- and p75-wages of the global
distribution in 2001 PPP-USD. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
by choice of the metric. This is reﬂected by columns 3-7 in Table 3. For instance,
US households also rank ﬁrst under the “rent” metric while the average percentile is
even slightly increased. That is, some US households are replaced at the bottom of
the distribution by households from countries like Ireland, where a higher preference for
leisure is observed (percentile 47 on average for the “rent” metric after 53 for income).
The picture successively changes when moving to the “rent + reference wage” criteria and
ﬁnally, to the “wage” metric. In the latter case, US households rank at the 57th percentile
on average versus Irish households at the 74th. Changes in the same direction as for the US
are even more pronounced among Nordic countries while changes in the opposite direction
are particularly strong for Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. The diﬀerence between
average ranks under the “rent” and the “wage” metric is presented in the last column,
with remarkable changes of at least 15 percentage points for 7 out of 12 countries. The
magnitude of rank reversals is all the more striking as our selection of countries is quite
homogeneous, focusing on the relatively wealthy EU countries (Continental and Nordic
Europe plus the two Anglo-Saxon countries) and the US.22 Thus, this result suggests
22The case of Portugal is an exception. It is diﬀerent from other Southern countries in the sense that
female participation is very high. However, wage rates are extremely low (among the lowest in Europe).
This explains why ranking diﬀerences between the metrics for Portuguese households themselves exist as
expected while there are simply too few households changing their relative international position to push
Portuguese households on average out of the bottom of the global distribution.
20that heterogeneous consumption-leisure preferences are the driving factor for individual
rerankings across countries. In addition, note that international rankings are aﬀected by
population size, which may even limit the extent of rank reversals for large countries. The
same is true for natural diﬀerences in household non-labor income (husband’s earnings)
and female wages across countries (given individual choices).23
Table 4: Average percentile position of the income poor (lowest quintile) in the global
welfare ranking - by country and metrics
Full heterogeneity in preferences ∆pp
Income Rent RW p25 RW p50 RW p75 Wage Rent-Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AT 11.8 9.2 20.9 29.6 36.8 41.3 32.1
BE 20.5 22.2 21.2 20.9 21.1 21.5 -0.7
DK 20.4 23.9 15.1 13.2 12.3 12.6 -11.3
FI 6.2 9.6 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.6 -7.0
FR 5.5 5.7 8.0 9.9 11.9 11.0 5.3
DE 9.0 10.1 15.2 20.4 25.1 29.4 19.3
IE 18.2 11.3 22.5 33.8 44.5 55.3 43.9
NL 15.8 17.4 25.0 31.0 36.5 41.4 24.0
PT 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -0.1
SW 13.4 18.0 5.9 5.3 5.1 5.4 -12.6
UK 10.7 10.4 14.1 17.6 20.8 22.3 11.9
US 18.6 18.3 18.0 19.1 20.6 21.2 2.9
Note: See Table 3. For each metric, we take the percentile position of each household of the
lowest income quintile in the respective country and average. ∆MRS is the diﬀerence of
MRSc(¯ h);¯ h for the income poor to the country average as reported in Table 2. Source: Own
calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
While Table 3 illustrates potential rerankings of all households in a country on average
across the diﬀerent metrics, a similar analysis for the (income) poor might lead to diﬀerent
conclusions - especially, when preferences of a country’s worst-oﬀ suﬃciently diﬀer from
the average preferences in that country. Table 4 therefore shows how the poorest quintile
of a country’s households in terms of income on average is reranked across the diﬀerent
metrics in the global distribution.24 For most countries, results show by and large the same
direction as in Table 3, again summarized by the diﬀerence between average ranks under
23Note that, given the ordinal framework, we do not need any information about the diﬀerences in the
levels of the metrics to answer the question of who will be considered better or worse oﬀ. However, we
also checked if the diﬀerences in the average ranks correspond to (economically) signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the levels of the metrics. With view to column (8) in Table 3, we ﬁnd considerable average diﬀerences in
levels between the “rent” and the “wage” metric (deﬁned as full-time equivalent for better comparison),
ranging from 18 PPP-EUR for Finland to 695 PPP-EUR for Ireland. Also across countries - exemplarily
comparing the US and Ireland (as in Figure 3) - we ﬁnd that the absolute average diﬀerences across
the metrics are substantial, ranging from 331 PPP-EUR for the “rent” metric to -245 PPP-EUR for the
full-time “wage” equivalent.
24This should be distinguished from a feature of the metrics applied which has not been mentioned so
far. In fact, it has been shown that the normative principles underlying the diﬀerent metrics also single
21the “rent” and the “wage” metric in the last column. The extent of rerankings, however,
diﬀers. For instance, the income poor in Portugal ﬁnd themselves in the lowest percentile
of the global distribution and thus, unsurprisingly fare also worst under the remaining
metrics, with a marginal improvement for the “rent” metric only. Contrary, rerankings
are even more signiﬁcant for households from countries with a relatively lower preference
for work, as e.g. Ireland. For Belgium, there is barely an eﬀect and most interestingly,
the ranking of the poor in the US changes in the opposite direction compared to Table
3. These eﬀects might be somewhat explained with view to Table 7 in the Appendix,
revealing clearly higher MRS for this group in both countries compared to the average.
Interpretation. As explained in Section 3, the metrics applied diﬀer only in the way
they treat heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences. As a result, agents with dif-
ferent willingness-to-work might be evaluated very diﬀerently depending on the metric.
Then, the ﬁrst and most important question is, who will be considered better and worse oﬀ
under the various criteria. Therefore, we focused on a pure index ordering for each metric
based on individual percentile positions in the accordant global distribution. In terms of
country comparisons, we may cluster households according to certain groups of countries.
For instance, households from apparently “work-loving countries” (as Denmark and the
US) are better oﬀ on average than households from apparently “work-averse nations”
(e.g., Austria and Ireland) under the “rent” criterion. The reason is that with the “rent”
metric, the policy maker tends to evaluate an agent with a higher willingness-to-work to
be better oﬀ compared to another agent with a lower willingness-to-work (assigning low
responsibility for work aversion). Thus, the latter would eventually be favored to receive
redistribution from the former and on average, we make more interpersonal comparisons
of this sort “favoring” households from Ireland rather than from the US. Contrary, under
the “wage” metric, we obviously more often favor households from the US over those
from Ireland (due to maximal responsibility assigned to work aversion). However, these
considerations are based on the average percentiles for all households while we might con-
clude diﬀerently when looking at subgroups (income quintiles) of a countries population,
as additionally considered in the previous paragraph.
out a speciﬁc way of how to aggregate them, namely using a maximin (leximin) social welfare function
with inﬁnite aversion to inequality and thus, focusing on the worst-oﬀ (Fleurbaey, 2008). Again, as this
paper is about interpersonal comparisons and not about social evaluation, we do not consider any type
of an aggregator function for our analysis. However, looking at how the poor of each country fare in the
world distribution might be worth for answering the question of who will be better or worse oﬀ under
which metric.
225.3 Assessing the diﬀerences in welfare rankings
Finally, we check what among the direct components of the labor supply model, i.e. es-
timated country-speciﬁc α and β parameters or country diﬀerences in socio-demographic
household composition (taste shifters), can explain the diﬀerences in the welfare rankings.
Recall from Section 4 that both factors determine overall heterogeneity in consumption-
leisure preferences and are solely responsible for ranking diﬀerences between the metrics
(Figure 2). We start with identical preferences imposed for each household in the sample,
isolate all components related to the two factors and separately introduce heterogeneity
based on the set of estimates as derived in Section 5.1 - while keeping individual budgets
and observed choices (c,h) ﬁxed. We thus do not re-estimate the models but perform a
pure decomposition analysis with respect to observed heterogeneity. Under these condi-
tions, we recalculate the metrics and check each time how international distributions are
aﬀected. Results reported in Table 5 ﬁrst show the coeﬃcient of variation for MRS. Varia-
tion in MRS is taken as an indicator for the extent to which a certain factor contributes to
overall taste diﬀerences. Columns 2 to 6 present how empirical rank correlations between
the “rent” and the further metrics change for the diﬀerent scenarios (equivalent to the
correlation plots presented in Figure 2).
Table 5: Variation in MRS and correlation between metrics by diﬀerent sources of pref-
erence heterogeneity
Source of preference heterogeneity: Coeﬀ. var. Rank correlation of Rent metric with
Pref. parameters Socio-demographics in MRS Income RW p25 RW p75 Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Identical Identical 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
Identical Age only 0.04 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
Identical Education only 0.20 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.94
Identical Children only 0.31 0.98 0.97 0.90 0.88
Identical All 0.35 0.98 0.96 0.86 0.82
Country-speciﬁc Identical 0.40 0.96 0.95 0.82 0.77
Country-speciﬁc Age only 0.40 0.97 0.95 0.84 0.79
Country-speciﬁc Education only 0.40 0.96 0.95 0.81 0.75
Country-speciﬁc Children only 0.65 0.98 0.92 0.72 0.60
Country-speciﬁc All 0.60 0.99 0.91 0.70 0.59




with global mean hours ¯ h and
corresponding net income c(¯ h) and averaged. c-values in 2001 PPP-USD. The median
household in terms of this MRS serves as the reference household. Source: Own calculations
based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
In the baseline scenario (ﬁrst row), we assume reference preferences, i.e. preference
23parameters and characteristics are taken from the median MRS household as deﬁned
above.25 The coeﬃcient of variation for MRS equals zero by construction and the cor-
relation between the “rent” metric and income equals 0.98, while being perfect for the
other metrics (which corresponds to the aforementioned results in the top panels of Figure
2). Rows 2-5 introduce heterogeneity in socio-demographic characteristics. That is, all
preference parameters are held constant according to the reference household but some
characteristics are allowed to change across countries and households. In row 2, age dif-
ferences are the only source of variation. Obviously, this cannot explain much of the
variation in MRS and leaves the empirical correlations across metrics barely unchanged.
Education levels and especially the presence of children seem to explain more of the varia-
tion in MRS (rows 3 and 4); as a result, rank correlations between income and the metrics
become weaker when moving towards the “wage” metric. These eﬀects cumulate when
heterogeneity in all three characteristics is allowed (row 5).
In rows 6-9, country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in preferences are considered. First, all socio-
demographic characteristics are kept constant and only diﬀerences in estimated preference
parameters determine heterogeneity in tastes. That is, α and β parameters are the only
source of variation across countries while characteristics zi are set according to the refer-
ence household. The magnitude of the eﬀect is very similar to that of accounting for all
socio-demographic characteristics in the case before. Thus, country-speciﬁc consumption-
leisure preferences already explain a good deal of the observed variation in MRS and be-
tween the metrics. Second, country diﬀerences in socio-demographics are combined with
variation in diﬀerent characteristics in rows 7-9. Here, especially the presence of young
children has a substantial impact on the variation across countries, which seems to account
for most of the variation when allowing for full heterogeneity in characteristics and esti-
mated preference parameters (last row). A standard variance decomposition (ANOVA)
for MRS and diﬀerences in individual ranks across metrics supports these ﬁndings. That
is, country-speciﬁc preferences as well as the correlation between country-speciﬁc prefer-
ences and family size (children) are most important and signiﬁcant factors of variation
(detailed results are available upon request).
While the results presented so far only give an intuition about what aﬀects overall
correlation between the ordinal metrics, nothing is said yet about which factors actually
drive the observed diﬀerences in individual cross-country rankings. Therefore, we addi-
tionally reproduce welfare rankings, again in terms of average percentiles, for the two main
counterfactual scenarios reﬂecting the diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity. In the Appendix,
Table 8(a) only maintains diﬀerences in socio-demographic characteristics while in Table
25Note that results will depend on the choice of the reference household, why they should also at
this stage be considered as illustrative. However, we check for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the reference
household in Section 5.4.
248(b), only the heterogeneity in preference parameters is accounted for. As can be seen,
the diﬀerences between metrics and across countries in Table 8(b) are by and large similar
to the orderings in Table 3. In contrast, Table 8(a) only reveals a very small inﬂuence of
demographics on average ranking positions. This conﬁrms the intuition from the previous
results that the ranking of individuals across countries in Table 3 is primarily aﬀected by
estimated country-speciﬁc preferences (rather than by demographic composition).26
5.4 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform robustness checks with respect to the labor supply speciﬁcation,
the calculation of the empirical welfare metrics and the decomposition analysis.
Labor supply model. For the illustrative purpose of this paper, an interpretationally
simple speciﬁcation for the labor supply model has been used. A Box-Cox speciﬁcation for
the deterministic part of the utility function – as often used in the normative literature
– seemed particularly suitable since monotonicity and concavity conditions are usually
fulﬁlled which can easily be checked ex-post. Using a more ﬂexible functional form (e.g.
quadratic, see Bargain et al, 2012) is more frequent in the empirical literature on labor
supply and taxation. However, notice that the gains from ﬂexibility are partly lost in the
present context given that tangency conditions must be imposed (which can be done by
adding monotonicity and concavity requirements as constraints directly into the likelihood
maximization). This is checked for the countries under analysis using the same data.
Results are summarized in Figure 4 in the Appendix, which plots diﬀerent average MRS
as deﬁned in Table 2 for the Box-Cox versus a (constrained) quadratic speciﬁcation for
the labor supply model. Results are very similar and especially country rankings in terms
of MRS are mainly preserved. 27
Calculation of welfare metrics. We calculate welfare metrics by using indiﬀerence
curves based on estimated preference parameters and corresponding to a certain level
of utility. In the baseline, this level of welfare is taken as the expected value over a
large number of draws for the EV-I random terms (while always taking the resulting
optimal level of utility). However, alternative ways of computation can be suggested,
also consistent with the random nature of the labor supply model. First, metrics for
each optimal utility level of each draw are computed while averaging then follows over all
26There are few exceptions. For France, the trend in Table 3 is more similar to Table 8(a), suggesting
that the demographic composition drives the result for this country. Also Belgium shows a reverse
inﬂuence of demographics, which, however, does not outweigh the impact of estimated preferences.
27Starting with 7 hours choices for both speciﬁcations as described above, we also ﬁnd that estimation
results are robust to choosing an even narrower choice set with 13 categories (0 to 60 hours/week with a
step of 5 hours). See also Bargain et al (2012).
25calculated metric values (for each individual) rather than utilities. Second, we compute
the metrics for the utility level corresponding to each discrete hours category and directly
take the weighted sum (by predicted probabilities using the expected random term) -
rather then artiﬁcially drawing many random terms. While these alternative procedures
necessarily change the levels of the metrics, we ﬁnd that they basically do not aﬀect the
resulting orderings compared to the baseline results. This is shown in Figure 5 in the
Appendix where average percentile positions by countries are plotted for the baseline
method 1 (denoted “expected utility”) against methods 2 (denoted “expected metrics”)
and 3 (denoted “probabilities”).
Speciﬁcation of the reference household. For the decomposition analysis in Section
5.3, the reference household in the baseline scenario was speciﬁed according to the me-
dian MRSc(¯ h);¯ h. However, variation in MRS and, hence, correlation between the metrics
when partly introducing preference heterogeneity, might be sensitive to that speciﬁca-
tion. Thus, as a robustness check, further speciﬁcations for the reference household have
been set with respect to p10-, (p50-) and p90-values in the global distribution of MRS
(net income c). Table 9 shows that there is suﬃcient heterogeneity across the reference
households selected, both in terms of the country they stem from and in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics. Average MRS, the coeﬃcient of variation for MRS and
correlation between the metrics of course change quantitatively with the speciﬁcation.
Yet, our core results do not change, i.e. the ﬁnding that estimated country-speciﬁc pref-
erence parameters (rather then socio-demographic diﬀerences) determine heterogeneity in
the rankings across metrics and countries is conﬁrmed. Figures 6 and 7 in the Appendix
plot average percentiles under the “rent” against the ”RW p50“ and the “wage” metric
- by diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the reference household and for the two main scenarios
corresponding to Table 8. Clearly, Figure 7 (where heterogeneity is only due to estimated
preference parameters) shows remarkable variation of country average percentiles across
the diﬀerent metrics while this is not true for Figure 6 (where heterogeneity is only due
to socio-demographic characteristics). Again, also absolute values for average percentiles
are aﬀected by the choice of the reference household, however, relative diﬀerences in the
country rankings are basically preserved.
6 Concluding discussion
The aim of this paper was to contribute to the ‘beyond GDP’-debate in terms of inter-
personally comparing well-being in several dimensions and across diﬀerent countries. We
have departed from standard income rankings by the inclusion of leisure, hence, respect-
ing one of the most primary speciﬁcations of welfare in the normative literature. Our
26main focus was to illustrate for the consumption-leisure space the use of welfare metrics
that take preference heterogeneity into account. Our results suggest that diﬀerences in
consumption-leisure preferences – and their normative treatment – might matter sub-
stantially when interpersonally evaluating welfare in an international context. Precisely,
households from apparently “work-loving countries” (e.g. the US or Denmark) rank higher
on average under criteria that evaluate agents with a higher willingness-to-work to be bet-
ter oﬀ compared to agents with a lower willingness-to-work. Inversely, households from
the more “work-averse nations”(e.g. Austria or Ireland) are on top of the ranking on
average with a metric that considers agents with a relatively lower willingness-to-work as
better oﬀ. The reranking of households between nations when moving from the former
to the latter types of welfare criteria is substantial, which is noticeable given that we
consider a relatively homogeneous set of countries and since the welfare measures only
add one dimension to income (“leisure”). A decomposition analysis showed that cross-
country diﬀerences in consumption-leisure preferences are driving this result. However,
these statements, formulated on basis of the normative background of the metrics ap-
plied, should be solely understood in terms of interpersonal comparisons; the application
to social criteria and actual cross-country redistribution is left for future research.
For the sake of illustration and implementation of the welfare metrics, we intended to
keep the empirical framework of this paper simple. Hence, a lot remains to be done to
bring empirical estimations closer to the possibility of sound normative evaluations. In
particular, the ﬁt of labor supply models is often improved by the introduction of a term
accounting for ﬁxed costs of work. Thus it is possible to rationalize the non-participation
of some people in terms of ﬁxed costs rather than through steep indiﬀerence curves –
and introducing ﬁxed costs would certainly reduce some of the apparent diﬀerences in
MRS across household types and countries. However, ﬁxed costs of work are usually not
identiﬁed from preferences, as shown by Van Soest et al (2002), but, if introduced in the
model, they may in fact capture some elements of work disutility (or even work utility, i.e.,
negative ﬁxed costs, if inactivity is a source of despair, as shown by Clark and Oswald,
1994). A similar logic applies to demand-side constraints which restrict the choice set
available to the individual (Dagsvik, 1994; Aaberge et al, 1999; Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006)
and could also result in involuntary unemployment (Peichl and Siegloch, 2012). Here, a
speciﬁc and additionally demanding requirement in the present context would have been
to determine country-speciﬁc choice opportunities. In addition, one limitation of the mi-
crosimulation models we use is that in-kind beneﬁts or public services more generally
are not taken into account due to data limitations. As the levels of non-cash transfers
diﬀer across countries, this has implications for cross-country diﬀerences in welfare met-
rics. However, it is hard to assess ex-ante how accounting for public services would aﬀect
the estimation of consumption-leisure preferences and hence the diﬀerent welfare rank-
27ings. Importantly, the construction and especially interpretation of welfare metrics as
used in the present paper is clearly more complicated when additionally accounting for
the various factors mentioned, i.e., especially in presence of non-regular and possibly dis-
continuous indiﬀerence curves. We leave these considerations for further research. Also,
we have chosen to model married women’s labor supply since variability in work hours
of this group is more likely to reﬂect true choices in the consumption-leisure space (and
responses to ﬁnancial incentives) compared to other groups. Of course, a more complete
welfare analysis across countries should ﬁrst include other subgroups as well and second,
consider further dimensions of individual well-being besides income and leisure. Finally,
comprehensive international welfare comparisons might also involve further aspects as
the respect for diﬀerent population sizes or intertemporal comparisons (Fleurbaey and
Tadenuma, 2009).
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32A Appendix:
Table 6: Marginal rates of substitution (between consumption and labor) by subgroups
MRS Standard MRS MRS MRS (
c(¯ h),¯ h
)
error (c(hp10),hp10) (c(hp50),hp50) (c(hp90),hp90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample 8.7 (5.3) 7.0 9.6 12.0
Children younger 3 13.7 (6.6) 10.9 15.0 18.8
Children between 3 and 6 13.5 (6.9) 10.8 14.8 18.5
Children between 7 and 12 10.8 (5.7) 8.6 11.8 14.8
No young children 6.3 (2.9) 5.0 6.9 8.6
Low education 12.5 (5.9) 10.0 13.9 17.3
Medium education 9.1 (5.0) 7.2 10.0 12.5
High education 7.3 (4.6) 5.8 8.0 10.0
Wife younger 25 7.4 (4.7) 5.9 8.1 10.1
Wife between 25 and 55 8.9 (5.3) 7.1 9.8 12.2
Wife older than 55 7.7 (4.3) 6.1 8.4 10.5
Husband younger 25 6.8 (3.9) 5.4 7.4 9.3
Husband between 25 and 55 8.9 (5.4) 7.1 9.8 12.2
Husband older than 55 7.7 (3.7) 6.2 8.5 10.6
Note: See Table 2. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
33Table 7: MRS between consumption and labor for the income poor by countries








AT 14.5 (5.3) 1.3
BE 8.1 (2.5) 1.0
DK 6.1 (0.7) 0.6
FI 4.1 (0.5) 0.3
FR 11.2 (3.1) 1.7
DE 13.7 (8.5) 0.5
IE 20.6 (8.0) 3.0
NL 14.7 (6.1) 1.5
PT 3.5 (1.0)  0.2
SW 6.1 (0.7) 0.8
UK 10.9 (5.4) 1.3
US 8.4 (4.0) 1.6




as reported in Table 2. Source:
Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
34Table 8: Average percentile positions for diﬀerent sources of preference heterogeneity
(a) Source of preference heterogeneity: diﬀerences in socio-demographic composition
Income Rent RW p25 RW p50 RW p75 Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AT 43.6 47.7 47.4 47.2 47.1 47.3
BE 49.2 45.9 48.7 49.8 50.7 51.4
DK 47.2 41.1 41.1 41.0 41.1 41.5
FI 29.7 24.1 22.6 22.5 22.6 22.6
FR 34.4 33.7 35.1 35.9 36.6 37.0
GE 36.3 39.7 39.3 39.3 39.5 40.1
IE 53.1 55.5 56.5 57.1 57.5 58.2
NL 47.6 51.0 52.5 53.1 53.6 54.4
PT 19.1 17.2 18.2 18.8 19.5 18.8
SW 38.1 33.5 32.0 31.5 31.3 31.3
UK 45.0 45.8 45.9 45.8 45.8 45.8
US 63.3 62.4 61.9 61.6 61.2 60.9
(b) Source of preference heterogeneity: diﬀerences in estimated preference parameters
Income Rent RW p25 RW p50 RW p75 Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AT 43.6 41.6 50.7 55.1 57.9 59.3
BE 49.2 50.5 47.6 44.7 42.2 41.1
DK 47.2 50.4 38.4 33.3 29.8 29.3
FI 29.7 35.5 18.2 14.9 12.9 13.4
FR 34.4 36.8 33.9 32.8 32.3 32.2
DE 36.3 31.4 41.3 47.4 52.2 55.4
IE 53.1 42.7 52.9 62.2 69.9 78.6
NL 47.6 44.7 53.1 58.4 62.9 67.5
PT 19.1 21.2 16.1 14.7 13.6 13.4
SW 38.1 42.5 29.3 26.2 24.4 24.5
UK 45.0 43.4 47.1 47.9 48.6 48.6
US 63.3 64.4 61.6 59.5 57.8 56.2
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MRS (p90 bundle) − Box−Cox
Note: MRS as described in Table 2; line = exact equality of MRS.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
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Method 1 (expected utility)
Wage metric
Note: Methods as described in Section 5.4; line = exact equality of average percentiles.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
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Note: Line = exact equality of average percentiles.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
RW p50 Wage
Figure 6: Average percentile positions when preference heterogeneity due to socio-
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c−p90
Note: Line = exact equality of average percentiles.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
RW p50 Wage
Figure 7: Average percentile positions when preference heterogeneity due to estimated
preference parameters only - by diﬀerent reference households
38Table 9: Descriptive statistics for reference households in decomposition analysis
Reference Age Age Child Child Child Low Med. MRS Net





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
MRS p10 US 37 35       X   4.0 672
MRS p50 FR 44 45     X     7.4 862
MRS p90 NL 39 30   X   X   14.5 965
c p10 BE 28 30 X X     X 9.4 632
c p50 UK 46 47       X   7.3 789
c p90 SW 48 47           4.6 1504
Note: MRS p10 (c p10) is the household with the p10-value for MRS (net income) in the
global distribution. For p50- and p90-values accordingly. Income in 2001 PPP-USD. Source:
Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
39